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The Takings Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) ab-
rogates the defense of sovereign immunity when a foreign government takes prop-
erty in violation of international law. But the exception does not specify whether 
plaintiffs must first exhaust local remedies in the relevant foreign country before 
filing suit in the United States. In the absence of clear statutory guidance, the circuit 
courts have reached divergent conclusions: the Seventh Circuit has held that the 
exhaustion rule is required under customary international law, the Ninth Circuit 
has suggested that courts could impose it at their discretion for reasons of comity, 
and the DC Circuit has determined that courts cannot impose the exhaustion rule 
under any circumstance. 
This Comment argues that international law does not obligate US courts to 
impose the exhaustion rule and that they should not impose it at their discretion 
because doing so would conflict with congressional intent in a sensitive area of for-
eign policy. Courts should, however, require international takings plaintiffs to ex-
haust local remedies when the president advises them that the requirement would 
advance the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. Grant-
ing a limited amount of deference to the executive branch resolves the circuit split in 
a manner that respects the intent of the FSIA while also minimizing undue judicial 
interference in the nation’s relationship with foreign countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By 1976, Congress recognized that foreign states and their 
business enterprises were common participants in the global 
economy, often transacting with US citizens. It further recognized 
that there were no uniform or comprehensive rules governing 
when and how private parties could bring suit against those for-
eign governments in the courts of the United States.1 The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 19762 (FSIA) was enacted to address 
these concerns. The Act grants foreign states sovereign immunity 
from federal and state jurisdiction as a general rule but carves 
out a number of exceptions.3 Among them is the expropriation ex-
ception, which revokes the defense of sovereign immunity when a 
foreign state seizes property in violation of international law. For 
the exception to apply, either the property or the foreign state ac-
tor at issue must have some commercial nexus with the United 
States.4 
Circuit courts disagree about whether plaintiffs must ex-
haust local remedies in the relevant foreign country before filing 
suit in the United States under the expropriation exception. The 
Seventh Circuit holds that the exception requires courts to apply 
substantive international law when determining whether the 
plaintiff’s property has been expropriated. This carries with it the 
jurisdictional limitations of international law, including the ex-
haustion of local remedies requirement.5 The Ninth Circuit ar-
gues, however, that the only permissible limits on the jurisdiction 
of federal courts are those found in Article III of the Constitution 
 
 1 See HR Rep No 94-1487, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 6–7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
USCCAN 6604, 6604–05. 
 2 Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976), codified in various sections of Title 28. 
 3 See 28 USC §§ 1604–07. 
 4 See 28 USC § 1605(a)(3). See also Philipp v Federal Republic of Germany, 894 F3d 
406, 410 (DC Cir 2018) (Philipp I), cert granted, Germany v Philipp, 2020 WL 3578677. 
 5 See Fischer v Magyar Államvasutak Zrt, 777 F3d 847, 854–55 (7th Cir 2015). 
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and federal statutes. A jurisdictional limitation of international 
law, like the exhaustion of local remedies requirement, cannot be 
binding.6 The court, however, remains open to the possibility of 
applying the rule on a discretionary basis.7 The DC Circuit, mean-
while, concludes that the exhaustion requirement cannot be ap-
plied in any fashion. It holds that Congress enacted the FSIA as 
a comprehensive statement of the rules governing sovereign im-
munity and that there is no basis for an exhaustion requirement 
in the statutory language.8 
There is one question at the heart of the circuit split: Do 
courts have authority to require that plaintiffs exhaust local rem-
edies before suing a foreign government under the expropriation 
exception? In order to clarify how and why this question has 
arisen in the case law, Part I explains the origins of the FSIA, the 
scope of the expropriation exception, and the circuit split. Part II 
then addresses whether exhaustion is a mandatory rule under in-
ternational law that US courts are obligated to apply. It concludes 
that the exhaustion rule—as understood within international 
law—might only apply to international courts, would not neces-
sarily bind US courts (even if applicable in the domestic context), 
and would create a preclusion trap if it did. Part III addresses 
whether courts could impose the exhaustion rule at their discre-
tion. It concludes that the FSIA does not explicitly prohibit dis-
cretionary exhaustion, but that such a rule would conflict with 
congressional intent in the area of foreign policy and is therefore 
inappropriate. Part IV addresses the DC Circuit’s view that the 
FSIA forbids the courts from requiring exhaustion. It concludes 
that the view is mistaken as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
Part V, finally, proposes that the courts should accord strong per-
suasive weight to the executive branch when it requests an appli-
cation of the exhaustion rule to a case brought under the expro-
priation exception. 
This Comment argues, in brief, that the only circumstance in 
which the exhaustion requirement would be appropriate is when 
the president determines that it would advance the national in-
terest and expressly recommends it for a specific case. This posi-
tion has the unique virtue of ensuring that courts do not unduly 
interfere with the nation’s foreign policy objectives, while still 
 
 6 Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain, 580 F3d 1048, 1061–62 (9th Cir 2009) (Cassirer II). 
 7 See Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain, 616 F3d 1019, 1036–37 (9th Cir 2010) (en banc) 
(Cassirer III). 
 8 See Philipp I, 894 F3d at 416. 
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respecting the will of Congress as expressed through the FSIA. It 
would be similar to the kind of deference that courts have afforded 
the executive branch in other contexts involving foreign policy. 
And it is amply justified by the president’s distinct authority in 
the realm of international relations. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The dispute between the circuit courts cannot be dismissed 
as intercircuit quibbling over procedural minutiae. It is important 
to foreign governments because they may incur substantial liabil-
ity if expropriation suits are litigated (in the first instance) in the 
United States. It is important for the United States because it 
implicates broader questions about the status of international 
law in the US legal system and the balance of power among the 
three branches of government in the realm of foreign affairs. But 
to see how these important questions arise, we must first under-
stand what prompted this intercircuit dispute over the exhaus-
tion rule. Accordingly, this Part provides a general overview of 
the history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. It then ex-
plores the types of disputes that have arisen under the expropri-
ation exception and the various arguments the circuit courts have 
adduced to support or reject the exhaustion requirement. 
A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The United States originally applied the absolute theory of 
sovereign immunity to shield foreign governments from suit in all 
circumstances.9 This system, however, proved inadequate to pro-
tect the rights of private parties who entered into contracts with 
foreign governments.10 In 1952, the State Department adopted 
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, under which foreign 
governments are immune from civil court jurisdiction only with 
respect to their public acts, not their private commercial transac-
tions.11 This, too, yielded inadequate results, as the Department 
 
 9 See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 in Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 Intl & Comp L Q 302, 303 (1986). Mark Feldman 
was the deputy legal adviser of the State Department, in which capacity he helped to draft 
the FSIA. 
 10 See id at 303. 
 11 Id. The shift in policy was famously announced in the “Tate Letter”—a document 
drafted by the State Department’s acting legal adviser, Jack B. Tate, and addressed to the 
acting US attorney general, Philip B. Perlman. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal 
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often felt it necessary to recommend sovereign immunity to the 
courts in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives, and the 
courts generally deferred to that judgment.12 Foreign govern-
ments, moreover, remained absolutely immune from the execution 
of judgments, making private suits practically inconsequential.13 
In 1976, Congress passed the FSIA in order to formally codify 
the restrictive theory, free the determination of sovereign immun-
ity from political pressures, and standardize the procedures gov-
erning lawsuits against foreign governments.14 The Act formally 
confers upon foreign governments an immunity from suit in fed-
eral and state courts but includes several exceptions.15 Among 
them is the expropriation exception, which states that “[a] foreign 
state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the 
United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in 
property taken in violation of international law are in issue.”16 For 
the exception to apply, two conditions must be met: (1) the plaintiff 
must have rights in property taken in violation of international 
law and (2) the expropriated property or the foreign state agency 
or instrumentality that controls the property must have some 
commercial nexus with the United States.17 
B. The Scope of the Expropriation Exception 
The courts tend to construe the scope of the FSIA exceptions 
broadly. The Supreme Court has ruled, for example, that any-
one—whether a citizen of the United States or not—can bring an 
action under any of the statute’s exceptions,18 and that the FSIA’s 
provisions apply to foreign state actions that occurred before the 
statute was enacted.19 This pattern of broad interpretation ex-
tends to the expropriation exception as well. For example, the ex-
propriation exception ordinarily does not apply to a foreign state’s 
seizure of the property of its own citizens. But courts have been 
 
Adviser, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), 26 Dept St Bull 
984 (1952). 
 12 Feldman, 35 Intl & Comp L Q at 303–04 (cited in note 9). 
 13 See id at 304. 
 14 Id at 304–05. 
 15 See 28 USC §§ 1604–07. For example, exceptions exist for suits “based upon a com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state” and for damages 
arising from a state’s sponsorship of terrorism. 28 USC §§ 1605(a)(2), 1605A(a)(1). 
 16 28 USC § 1605(a)(3). 
 17 See 28 USC § 1605(a)(3). See also Philipp v Federal Republic of Germany, 894 F3d 
406, 410 (DC Cir 2018) (Philipp I), cert granted, Germany v Philipp, 2020 WL 3578677. 
 18 Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 490 (1983). 
 19 Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 US 677, 697 (2004). 
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willing to suspend that rule when the relevant state did not re-
gard the plaintiff as a citizen—as illustrated in the case of Ger-
man Jews under the Third Reich.20 Some courts have gone so far 
as to conclude that a taking “in violation of international law” en-
compasses not just seizures that violate international takings law 
but seizures in furtherance of genocide.21 In other words, a plaintiff 
might be able to establish jurisdiction under the expropriation ex-
ception without demonstrating that the property at issue was 
taken without just compensation. That the taking was part of a 
program of genocide would be enough. 
This liberal construction of the expropriation exception has 
transformed the provision into an instrument of human rights lit-
igation. As Professor Vivian Curran notes in her recent article on 
the FSIA, “plaintiffs who had been victims of the Holocaust or Ar-
menian Genocide tend to frame claims for property expropriation 
where the property at issue might be of trivial value, but coexisted 
with physical and moral atrocities the victim had undergone.”22 
In one such case, the grandsons of two Armenian property owners 
brought a class action against Turkey for the forced relocation, 
expropriation, torture, and murder of ethnic Armenians during 
the First World War.23 The taking of real property was the pur-
ported basis for FSIA jurisdiction, but the most serious causes of 
action included violations of human rights.24 These examples 
show that some plaintiffs have used trivial violations of property 
rights as a basis for FSIA jurisdiction to litigate very serious hu-
man rights claims.25 
 
 20 See, for example, Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain, 461 F Supp 2d 1157, 1165–66 (CD 
Cal 2006) (Cassirer I) (“[S]ince Germany itself did not consider Ms. Cassirer to be a citizen, 
Ms. Cassirer’s alleged German ‘citizenship’ at the time of the taking does not preclude the 
application of the expropriation exception.”), affd in part and revd in part, 580 F3d 1048 
(9th Cir 2009). 
 21 See, for example, Abelesz v Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F3d 661, 675–76 (7th Cir 
2012) (interpreting 28 USC § 1605(a)(3) and finding that the expropriation of Jewish prop-
erty during the Holocaust effectuated genocide, and, for that reason, could constitute a 
taking in violation of international law). See also Simon v Republic of Hungary, 812 F3d 
127, 142–43 (DC Cir 2016) (reaching the same conclusion when an expropriation not just 
furthers but constitutes, in itself, an act of genocide). After remand, the Simon case re-
turned to the DC Circuit where the court held that the FSIA did not require exhaustion of 
local remedies. See generally Simon v Republic of Hungary, 911 F3d 1172 (DC Cir 2018), 
cert granted, Hungary v Simon, 2020 WL 3578676. 
 22 Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Evolving Gen-
ocide Exception, 23 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Affairs 46, 50 (2019). 
 23 Davoyan v Republic of Turkey, 116 F Supp 3d 1084, 1092–93 (CD Cal 2013). 
 24 Id at 1093. 
 25 This does not, of course, imply that such suits are always successful. Davoyan, for 
instance, was dismissed because the question whether the Ottoman Empire’s mass 
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Other plaintiffs, meanwhile, have attempted to use the ex-
propriation exception to obtain restitution from foreign govern-
ments for the uncompensated seizure of art during the Second 
World War. The descendants of a Jewish art collector, for exam-
ple, sued Hungary to reclaim pieces on display at the Hungarian 
National Gallery and other museums. The pieces were originally 
owned by the plaintiffs’ family but were later confiscated by the 
Hungarian government in collaboration with the Nazis.26 In an-
other case, the heir of another wealthy Jewish art collector sued 
Spain to reclaim a collection that his family member had sold to 
the Nazis under duress.27 Here, unlike in the genocide cases, 
plaintiffs primarily seek the return of (or compensation for) the 
expropriated property itself. And so the expropriation exception 
provides a particularly apt means of establishing jurisdiction to 
sue the offending state. 
The potential damages in the genocide and art restitution 
cases are immense. In one lawsuit challenging Hungary’s role in 
expropriating Jewish property during the Holocaust, the plaintiffs 
sought $75 billion in damages—nearly 40 percent of the country’s 
GDP at the time.28 The art restitution damages can also reach 
stratospheric heights, sometimes in the hundred-million-dollar 
range.29 At least one commentator, for this reason, has likened the 
restitution cases to the tobacco litigation of the twentieth century.30 
With hundreds of millions of dollars at stake, it is a question 
of supreme importance whether foreign states are at least owed 
an opportunity to redress expropriation claims through their own 
domestic procedures. 
C. Circuit Split on the Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
The circuit courts have uniformly held that nothing in the 
statutory language of the expropriation exception requires 
 
relocation of ethnic Armenians constituted genocide was a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion. See id at 1104. 
 26 De Csepel v Republic of Hungary, 714 F3d 591, 595–96 (DC Cir 2013). 
 27 Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain, 580 F3d 1048, 1052–53 (9th Cir 2009) (Cassirer II). 
 28 Abelesz, 692 F3d at 682. 
 29 See Lauren Fielder Redman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using a 
“Shield” Statute as a “Sword” for Obtaining Federal Jurisdiction in Art and Antiquities 
Cases, 31 Fordham Intl L J 781, 785 (2008). 
 30 Id at 781 (“Art and antiquities restitution cases may be the tobacco litigation of 
this decade, thanks to the jurisdiction-granting provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act.”). 
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plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies before filing suit in US 
courts.31 But while some courts conclude their analysis upon mak-
ing this observation, others proceed to import an exhaustion re-
quirement from customary international law. The Supreme Court 
has not resolved the matter one way or another, but it has indi-
cated that, “in an appropriate case,” the Court would consider the 
argument that plaintiffs must exhaust local remedies before su-
ing in a US court.32 
The Seventh Circuit applies an exhaustion requirement. The 
court first endorsed this position in Abelesz v Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank.33 There, a group of Holocaust survivors brought suit 
against the Hungarian national bank and the Hungarian na-
tional railway for their roles in expropriating property from Hun-
garian Jews during the Holocaust.34 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that “the requirement that domestic remedies for 
expropriation be exhausted before international proceedings may 
be instituted is ‘a well-established rule of customary international 
law’ that the United States itself has invoked”35 and should “be 
prepared to reciprocate.”36 The court ultimately remanded the 
case with instructions that the plaintiffs “either exhaust any 
available Hungarian remedies identified by the national bank 
and national railway or present to the district court a legally com-
pelling reason for their failure to do so.”37  
 
 31 See, for example, Abelesz, 692 F3d at 678 (“On the statutory exhaustion point, 
nothing in § 1605(a)(3) suggests that plaintiffs must exhaust domestic Hungarian reme-
dies before bringing suit in the United States.”); Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain, 616 F3d 
1019, 1034 (9th Cir 2010) (en banc) (Cassirer III) (“The expropriation exception says noth-
ing at all about exhaustion of remedies.”); Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v 
Russian Federation, 528 F3d 934, 948 (DC Cir 2008) (“As a preliminary matter, nothing 
in § 1605(a)(3) suggests that plaintiff must exhaust foreign remedies before bringing suit 
in the United States.”). 
 32 Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 733 n 21 (2004). Sosa, to be sure, was pri-
marily concerned with when courts can hear international law claims brought under the 
Alien Tort Statute, not the FSIA. But in a footnote, the Court expressed its willingness to 
apply the exhaustion requirement in broad terms. Specifically, it framed exhaustion as a 
potential limit on “the availability of relief in the federal courts for violations of customary 
international law.” Id. This suggests that the Court would be equally receptive to an ex-
haustion requirement when an international law claim is brought under the FSIA. 
 33 692 F3d 661 (7th Cir 2012). 
 34 Id at 665. 
 35 Id at 679, quoting Interhandel (Switzerland v United States of America), 1959 ICJ 
6, 26–27. 
 36 Id at 680. 
 37 Abelesz, 692 F3d at 666. 
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 The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed this position in 
Fischer v Magyar Államvasutak Zrt.38 The court found that “[a]t 
bottom, international law favors giving a state accused of taking 
property in violation of international law an opportunity to re-
dress it by its own means, within the framework of its own legal 
system before the same alleged taking may be aired in foreign 
courts.”39 The court also denied that the absence of an exhaustion 
requirement in the text of the FSIA precludes application of the 
doctrine. Such a reading, it noted, would cast doubt on the appli-
cation of established doctrines of federal common law like forum 
non conveniens.40 
The DC Circuit, by contrast, insists that reading in an ex-
haustion requirement from customary international law would 
vitiate the very purpose of the FSIA. In Philipp v Federal Repub-
lic of Germany,41 (Philipp I) a group of Frankfurt-based art deal-
ers were forced to sell their collection to the Nazis at a fraction of 
its worth. In 2014, their heirs demanded the return of the art-
works, first by referring their claim to an advisory commission, 
and then by filing suit against Germany in the DC District 
Court.42 The DC Circuit, following the reasoning from an earlier 
Supreme Court case,43 asserted that the purpose of the FSIA was 
to replace the executive-driven, case-by-case application of sover-
eign immunity with a clear statutory framework. Hence, the 
courts cannot look to extrinsic common law doctrines like the ex-
haustion of local remedies if they are entirely absent from the text 
of the statute.44 
 The court identified two additional problems with Germany’s 
exhaustion argument, stemming from other provisions of the 
FSIA. First, the terrorism exception expressly conditions jurisdic-
tion on “afford[ing] the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to 
 
 38 777 F3d 847 (7th Cir 2015). 
 39 Id at 855 (quotation marks omitted). 
 40 Id at 859. 
 41 894 F3d 406 (DC Cir 2018) (Philipp I), cert granted, Germany v Philipp, 2020 WL 
3578677. 
 42 Id at 409–10. 
 43 See Republic of Argentina v NML Capital, Ltd, 573 US 134, 141 (2014) (“Congress 
abated the bedlam in 1976, replacing the old executive-driven, factor-intensive, loosely 
common-law-based immunity regime with the [FSIA]’s comprehensive set of legal stand-
ards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state.”) (quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 44 Philipp I, 894 F3d at 415. Note, for future reference, that the exhaustion of local 
remedies is both a doctrine of federal common law, see Part III.A, and, separately, a doc-
trine of customary international law, see Part II.A. 
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arbitrate the claim,” but this language is not in the expropriation 
exception.45 And second, a separate provision of the FSIA “permits 
only defenses, such as forum non conveniens, that are equally 
available to private individuals. Obviously a private individual 
cannot invoke a sovereign’s right to resolve disputes against it.”46 
Judge Gregory Katsas vigorously argued for an exhaustion 
defense in his dissent from the DC Circuit’s denial of a petition 
for en banc rehearing. He argued, among other things, that the 
decision “disregard[s] the views of the Executive Branch on a mat-
ter of obvious foreign-policy sensitivity” and “clear[s] the way for 
a wide range of litigation against foreign sovereigns for public 
acts committed within their own territories. This includes claims 
not only for genocide, but also for the violation of most other 
norms of international human-rights law.”47 Moreover, he in-
sisted, the FSIA does not preclude, but rather “affirmatively ac-
commodates” the exhaustion defense, because § 1606 of the Act 
states that when a claim falls within one of the sovereign immun-
ity exceptions, “the foreign state shall be liable in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances.”48 Judge Katsas took this to mean that the state 
would be able to avail itself of the same defenses available to pri-
vate defendants sued under the Alien Tort Statute49 (ATS), 
among them the exhaustion doctrine.50 
The Ninth Circuit denied that the exhaustion doctrine could 
be a jurisdictional requirement binding on a federal court but was 
willing to apply the exhaustion rule on a discretionary basis. In 
Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain,51 a member of a wealthy Jewish 
family, then residing in Germany, was forced to sell her valuable 
painting to a Nazi art dealer as a precondition for permission to 
leave the country. After several resales to private art collectors, 
 
 45 Philipp I, 894 F3d at 415 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original), quot-
ing 28 USC § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 46 Philipp I, 894 F3d at 416 (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted) (em-
phasis in original). 
 47 Philipp v Federal Republic of Germany, 925 F3d 1349, 1350 (DC Cir 2019) 
(Philipp II) (Katsas dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 48 Id at 1355 (quotation marks omitted), quoting 28 USC § 1606. 
 49 1 Stat 73, 76–77, codified as amended at 28 USC § 1350. 
 50 Philipp II, 925 F3d at 1355–56 (Katsas dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (noting that the majority in Sosa was willing to consider applying the exhaustion 
requirement “in an appropriate case,” and that four justices had openly embraced the re-
quirement in several recent ATS cases). 
 51 580 F3d 1048 (9th Cir 2009) (Cassirer II), affd in part and dismissed in part, 616 
F3d 1019 (9th Cir 2010) (en banc). 
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the piece was eventually purchased by the Spanish government 
and displayed in the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum. One of her 
heirs filed suit in the Central District of California to recover the 
piece.52 The Ninth Circuit declared that “[i]nternational law may 
define the substantive rights of parties in actions permitted by 
the FSIA, but it cannot compel or restrict Article III jurisdic-
tion.”53 At the same time, however, the court was willing to “exer-
cise sound judicial discretion and consider exhaustion on a pru-
dential, case-by-case basis.”54 The Ninth Circuit, on rehearing en 
banc, confirmed the panel’s conclusion that “exhaustion is not a 
statutory prerequisite to jurisdiction” because it is not mentioned 
in the FSIA.55 However, because prudential or discretionary ex-
haustion is not a precondition for jurisdiction, the court declined 
to consider whether it might apply to the case at bar.56 
In brief, the Seventh Circuit considers the exhaustion rule 
mandatory, the Ninth Circuit deems it discretionary, and the DC 
Circuit finds it unauthorized and impermissible. This Comment 
contends that all three positions are flawed—the first two for per-
mitting exhaustion without the express authorization of Congress 
or the president, and the last for overlooking the possibility of def-
erence. This Comment addresses the error in each approach in 
turn and proposes a system granting deference to the president. 
II.  MANDATORY EXHAUSTION 
There are two suppositions at the heart of the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s argument that the exhaustion rule is mandatory. The first 
is that the exhaustion of local remedies is an established rule of 
customary international law that applies in domestic (not just in-
ternational) courts. The second is that the norms of international 
law are operable in the courts of the United States without prior 
federal legislation adopting those norms. This Part argues that 
the first supposition is plainly untrue and that the second is un-
settled. Furthermore, a mandatory exhaustion rule would gener-
ate a preclusion trap, which is strongly disfavored by recent Su-
preme Court precedent. 
 
 52 Id at 1052–53. 
 53 Id at 1061–62. 
 54 Id at 1062. 
 55 Cassirer III, 616 F3d at 1034. 
 56 Id at 1037. 
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A. Exhaustion as an Established Rule of International Law 
Exhausting local remedies was originally required before an 
alien whose rights had been violated abroad could receive diplo-
matic protection—that is, the assumption of her claim by her own 
government.57 This rule was conceived at a time when states (as 
opposed to individuals) were considered the sole subjects of inter-
national law; states were the agents upon whom international 
law could confer rights and impose obligations.58 One jurist theo-
rized that such assumption or internationalization of the private 
claim was necessary for the citizen to “obtain the chief end of civil 
society, which is protection.”59 The exhaustion rule, then, was a 
“prophylactic device . . . [that] reduce[d] tension likely to arise in 
an inter-State dispute over injuries to nationals abroad.”60 It ben-
efited both the injured alien, in that he would more likely obtain 
prompt relief by seeking local remedies, and the opposing sover-
eigns, in that their incipient dispute would more likely be re-
solved through ordinary domestic procedures.61 
Exhaustion also appears as a condition for accepting human 
rights complaints under the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.62 The 
Convention allows the “High Contracting Parties” (states) to 
bring a complaint of breach by another High Contracting Party 
before the European Commission—not to subsume the rights of 
its own nationals, but rather to enforce the public order the con-
vention seeks to protect.63 Individuals may also bring complaints 
before the Commission after exhausting local remedies.64 Exhaus-
tion serves a different function in human rights treaties than it 
does in the context of diplomatic protection. The purpose of ex-
haustion in the human rights context is not to promote comity or 
to diffuse interstate tension. Rather, it is “to avoid domestic 
courts being superseded by the international organ . . . [and] to 
avoid the international organ being ‘flooded’ with irrelevant 
 
 57 See A.A. Cançado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies in International Law: Its Rationale in the International Protection of Individual 
Rights 7 (Cambridge 1983). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 60 Id at 11 (quotation marks omitted). 
 61 Trindade, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law at 11–12 (cited in 
note 57). 
 62 Id at 3. 
 63 Id at 16. 
 64 Id at 17–18. 
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complaints.”65 Diffusing interstate tension in the human rights 
context is less important because states voluntarily accede to the 
treaties that plaintiffs seek to enforce.66 This suggests that the 
exhaustion rule is not a generally applicable principle of interna-
tional law, but one that applies in two very specific contexts, serv-
ing distinct purposes. 
So what is it that led the Seventh Circuit to view the exhaus-
tion of local remedies as a general rule for all courts applying in-
ternational law? The court rested much of its reasoning on Inter-
handel (Switzerland v United States),67 a case decided by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1959.68 In that case, the 
United States seized a subsidiary of a Swiss company, Interhan-
del, pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act shortly after 
entering the Second World War. The US government believed 
that Interhandel was controlled by a German parent company de-
spite Interhandel’s protestations that it had severed ties with the 
German company well before the United States had entered the 
war. After years of disagreement over the status of Interhandel 
and stalled litigation before the DC District Court, Switzerland 
brought an action before the ICJ to restore the assets of its na-
tional.69 The United States argued, among other things, that 
Switzerland needed to exhaust remedies in the United States be-
fore resorting to the ICJ. The ICJ agreed, finding that the Su-
preme Court of the United States had granted certiorari to the 
Interhandel suit and that Switzerland needed to avail itself of 
this further opportunity to obtain redress through US legal pro-
cedures.70 In so doing, the court unambiguously affirmed the va-
lidity of exhaustion as a rule in customary international law: 
The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before inter-
national proceedings may be instituted is a well-established 
rule of customary international law; the rule has been gener-
ally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause 
of its national whose rights are claimed to have been disre-
garded in another State in violation of international law. Be-
fore resort may be had to an international court in such a 
 
 65 Trindade, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law at 3 (cited in 
note 57). 
 66 Id at 51. 
 67 1959 ICJ 6. 
 68 See generally id, cited in Abelesz, 692 F3d at 680–81. 
 69 Interhandel, 1959 ICJ at 16–19. 
 70 Id at 26–27. 
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situation, it has been considered necessary that the State 
where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to 
redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own 
domestic legal system.71 
The ICJ’s description of the rule appears to support the Sev-
enth Circuit’s view that exhaustion of local remedies is a custom-
ary rule of international law. Crucially, however, this was an in-
stance of diplomatic protection. Switzerland had brought the 
lawsuit on behalf of Interhandel, placing the case squarely in one 
of the two distinct categories in which the exhaustion of local rem-
edies has historically been required—diplomatic protection and 
human rights complaints. This means that the case lends no sup-
port to the application of an exhaustion requirement outside 
those two contexts. Furthermore, the rule, as stated by the ICJ, 
seems limited to disputes brought before an international court 
and in which the opposing parties are states. It is not clear 
whether the exhaustion of local remedies rule applies to claims 
by private individuals before domestic tribunals. One could argue 
that because, in the context of diplomatic protection, the exhaus-
tion requirement serves to diffuse tensions between states, it can 
only apply when two states are parties before an international 
body, not when a private individual sues a foreign state (as is the 
case with FSIA disputes). But the jurisdiction-granting provi-
sions of the FSIA subject foreign states to the procedures, judg-
ments, and penalties of US courts. Although the countries are not 
parties to a dispute, their interests are at variance all the same. 
So if exhaustion of local remedies does not apply in the domestic 
context, it is certainly not for want of interstate tension. The bet-
ter argument is that the doctrine does not apply in the domestic 
context because there is no authority that frames the doctrine in 
terms capacious enough to support that application. 
All of this is to say that the exhaustion doctrine is indeed an 
established rule within international law. But the doctrine is usu-
ally either applied in the context of diplomatic protection or stated 
within the text of international conventions and resolutions (the 
European Convention on Human Rights, for example), and is in-
voked by international bodies attempting to comply with such 
agreements. The reasons for applying it—diffusing interstate ten-
sion and avoiding irrelevant complaints, for example—could be 
relevant in domestic courts. Indeed, when a domestic court 
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adjudicates a private dispute against a foreign country, that could 
generate tension between the forum country and the foreign state 
defendant. And domestic courts are no less susceptible to the 
kinds of frivolous lawsuits that partly justify the exhaustion re-
quirement in international courts. However, this only suggests 
that there may be reason to develop an exhaustion requirement 
for domestic courts applying customary international law. It is 
not sufficient to show that such a requirement, applicable to do-
mestic courts, already exists. 
B. The Authority of International Law in US Domestic Courts 
Even if international law required the exhaustion of local 
remedies to assert a claim for expropriation in domestic courts, it 
would not necessarily follow that US courts could apply that rule 
without prior congressional authorization. There are two domi-
nant—and divergent—strains of thought on whether customary 
international law has direct, binding effect in the United States. 
The modern view holds that customary international law is self-
executing—it is automatically federal law, it preempts contrary 
state law, and it need not be adopted by the political branches 
before doing so. To be sure, principles of international law, on this 
view, cannot be applied if they conflict with existing federal law 
and can still be nullified by subsequent congressional legislation. 
But they are operable in the absence of such legislation.72 Some 
courts and commentators justify this position on the ground that 
federal courts have the authority to incorporate rules of interna-
tional law into the federal common law.73 The competing revision-
ist view, however, holds that there is no history among the courts 
of treating international law as federal law. Rather, customary 
international law was considered “federal general common law” 
of the kind Erie Railroad Co v Thompkins74 invalidated.75 The po-
litical branches would have to explicitly incorporate customary 
 
 72 For discussion of such a view, see Gary Born, Customary International Law in 
United States Courts, 92 Wash L Rev 1641, 1648–49 (2017). See also The Paquete Habana, 
175 US 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions 
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”); Filartiga v Pena-
Irala, 630 F2d 876, 887 n 20 (2d Cir 1980) (“[I]nternational law has an existence in the 
federal courts independent of acts of Congress.”). 
 73 See Born, 92 Wash L Rev at 1649 (cited in note 72). 
 74 304 US 64 (1938). 
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1952 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1937 
 
international law through legislation before it could be considered 
preemptive federal law.76 
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the matter 
one way or another—and its most pertinent case on this question, 
Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,77 is amenable to various contradictory 
interpretations. In Sosa, a Mexican national, Humberto Alvarez-
Machain, was indicted for allegedly torturing and murdering an 
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). A group of 
Mexican civilians and a Mexican DEA operative forcibly abducted 
Alvarez-Machain from his home and transported him to Texas, 
where he was arrested.78 After being acquitted of the charges, 
Alvarez-Machain brought a civil action seeking damages both 
from the United States for false arrest under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, and from the Mexican DEA agent for violations of in-
ternational law under the ATS.79 One of the questions before the 
Court was whether the ATS (or any other source of US law) gave 
the plaintiff the right to sue for the alleged violations of interna-
tional law.80 
The ATS grants federal jurisdiction for “any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
. . . .”81 The Court noted that since the statute is purely jurisdic-
tional, it confers no statutory cause of action for torts in violation 
of international law.82 However, the Court found it implausible 
that the First Congress would have enacted the ATS “as a juris-
dictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future 
Congress or state legislature that might, someday, authorize the 
creation of causes of action.”83 Thus, as the Court concluded, the 
First Congress must have envisaged that courts would recognize 
a common law cause of action for some international torts.84 
Partly on the basis of this reasoning, the Court then ruled that 
 
 76 See id at 1650; Al-Bihani v Obama, 619 F3d 1, 13 (DC Cir 2010) (Kavanaugh con-
curring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“Only when international-law principles are in-
corporated into a statute or a self-executing treaty do they become domestic U.S. law en-
forceable in U.S. courts.”). 
 77 542 US 692 (2004). 
 78 Id at 697–98. 
 79 Id at 697–99. 
 80 Id at 700, 712. 
 81 28 USC § 1350. 
 82 Sosa, 542 US at 713. 
 83 Id at 719. 
 84 Id at 724. The Court found that the First Congress likely had only a few specific 
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courts can recognize, through the common law, those international 
law claims that “rest on a norm of international character accepted 
by the civilized world” and that are defined with “specificity.”85 
The implications of this ruling for the ongoing debate about 
the status of customary international law in the United States 
remain unclear. The modernists could herald the ruling as an ac-
knowledgment that some international law is directly binding, 
without needing to be enacted by the political branches.86 How-
ever, the revisionists could also point to the limited nature of the 
Court’s conclusion as vindication for their own view.87 Indeed, the 
holding permits courts to incorporate a narrow set of well-defined 
international law claims into the common law because without 
that power, the ATS would have been ineffectual at the time it 
was enacted. It does not suggest that any well-established rule or 
doctrine of customary international law is immediately applicable 
in US courts without statutory authorization. 
Suffice it to say, then, it is not obvious that an exhaustion 
rule under international law would be automatically operable in 
domestic courts. This presents a problem for the Seventh Circuit 
and any other court that treats exhaustion as a mandatory rule 
of international law that domestic courts are obligated to apply. 
Those courts would need to rigorously justify the modernist as-
sumptions underpinning their position, as this area of law re-
mains unsettled and those assumptions may well be mistaken. 
C. The Possibility of a Preclusion Trap 
The mandatory exhaustion rule would also permanently ex-
clude some plaintiffs from US courts. Exhausting local remedies, 
 
 85 Id at 725. For the full ruling, see id: 
[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of na-
tions to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world 
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paradigms [(violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassa-
dors, and piracy)] we have recognized. 
 86 See, for example, Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 
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national law according to which ATS human rights actions were intrinsically illegitimate.”). 
 87 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, and David H. Moore, Sosa, 
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv L Rev 869, 
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in many cases, would mean obtaining a judgment from a foreign 
court. Federal courts would then apply state law to determine 
whether that foreign judgment is entitled to recognition.88 And 
the law in most states is that, as a general matter, a “final, con-
clusive, and enforceable judgment of a court of a foreign state 
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, or determining a 
legal controversy, is entitled to recognition.”89 Judgments so rec-
ognized are given “the same preclusive effect . . . as the judgment 
of a sister State entitled to full faith and credit.”90 In other words, 
a litigant who loses his case abroad cannot relitigate the same 
claims in the courts of the United States. The problem is that the 
preclusive effect of foreign judgments, when paired with a man-
datory exhaustion rule, might categorically bar victims of inter-
national expropriation from ever suing in the United States. They 
cannot sue without seeking and obtaining a foreign judgment, as 
that judgment would be an unexhausted local remedy. Nor can 
they sue after judgment is rendered because their claims would 
be precluded under res judicata. 
Courts could not exercise equitable discretion to deny recog-
nition of a foreign judgment just to avoid creating a preclusion 
trap. According to the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, “[c]ourts in the United States do 
not have general discretion under State law to deny recogni-
tion.”91 Instead, the discretionary grounds for denying recognition 
of a foreign judgment are limited and well-defined. These include, 
for example, whether “the judgment was obtained by fraud” and 
whether it was “repugnant to the public policy” of a state or the 
United States.92 The trap is thus effectively unavoidable even for 
courts sympathetic to the plaintiff’s plight. 
A very similar conundrum had, until recently, plagued Fifth 
Amendment takings jurisprudence. In Williamson County Re-
gional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,93 
the Supreme Court established that the exhaustion of state rem-
edies was necessary for takings claims to be considered ripe in 
 
 88 See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 481 
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federal court. The Court reasoned that “[t]he Fifth Amendment 
does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking 
without just compensation. Nor does the Fifth Amendment re-
quire that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contempo-
raneously with, the taking.”94 What is required “is that a reason-
able, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation 
exist at the time of the taking.”95 The Court added that “[i]f the 
government has provided an adequate process for obtaining com-
pensation, and if resort to that process yields just compensation, 
then the property owner has no claim against the Government for 
a taking.”96 In essence, Fifth Amendment takings plaintiffs would 
need to exhaust state remedies before suing in federal court. 
The exhaustion requirement imposed in Williamson County, 
however, was very recently overruled by a 5–4 decision of the Su-
preme Court in Knick v Township of Scott, Pennsylvania.97 The 
Court reasoned that the Williamson County rule, when paired 
with the common law rule of claim preclusion, may have the prac-
tical effect of excluding all takings claims against a state from 
federal court. Once a state court enters final judgment against a 
plaintiff in a takings suit, that plaintiff generally cannot reliti-
gate his claim in federal court.98 As the Supreme Court explained, 
“[t]he takings plaintiff thus finds himself in a Catch-22: He can-
not go to federal court without going to state court first; but if he 
goes to state court and loses, his claim will be barred in federal 
court. The federal claim dies aborning.”99 The Court pointed to the 
case of San Remo Hotel, LP v City and County of San Francisco, 
California100 as an instance in which precisely this problem oc-
curred.101 Partly for this reason, the Court concluded that “the 
state-litigation requirement imposes an unjustifiable burden on 
takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our takings jurispru-
dence, and must be overruled. A property owner has an actionable 
Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his 
property without paying for it.”102 
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To be sure, there is some reason to think that the preclusion 
trap is unproblematic in practice. After all, a plaintiff can excuse 
her failure to exhaust local remedies by demonstrating that such 
remedies are “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inade-
quate, or obviously futile.”103 Additionally, the integrity of the for-
eign court, the fairness of its proceedings, and the convenience of 
the forum are all among the valid discretionary grounds for non-
recognition of a foreign judgment laid out in the Fourth Restate-
ment.104 The preclusion trap would thus occur only in those cases 
where the court has determined that the foreign judicial system 
and its remedies are worthy of respect. And it is perfectly sensible 
to prevent claims fairly and respectably adjudicated abroad from 
being relitigated. 
But the implied promise of the exhaustion rule is that US 
courts are available once a plaintiff has tried and failed to obtain 
relief in the country he seeks to sue. If the law were designed to 
exclude victims of expropriation from US courts regardless of 
what they do, then one would expect a clear rule (from the courts 
or from Congress) stating as much. But no such rule has been 
stated, much less rationally justified. The preclusion trap is in-
stead an unintended consequence of two unrelated legal princi-
ples working in tandem. And it leaves the impression that the 
courts have arbitrarily stumbled into a novel doctrinal result. The 
preclusion trap is thus one additional reason not to treat exhaus-
tion as a mandatory rule. 
III.  DISCRETIONARY EXHAUSTION 
The Ninth Circuit, in approving a discretionary exhaustion 
requirement, borrowed its reasoning from administrative law. 
The Supreme Court had already articulated the following princi-
ples for the exhaustion of administrative remedies: “Of para-
mount importance to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional in-
tent. Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is 
required. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaus-
tion, sound judicial discretion governs.”105 The Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly determined that the FSIA has no express provision for 
 
 103 See Cassirer II, 580 F3d at 1063 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Sarei v Rio 
Tinto, PLC, 550 F3d 822, 832 (9th Cir 2008). 
 104 Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 484 
cmts h–j (2018). 
 105 McCarthy v Madigan, 503 US 140, 144 (1992) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
2020] The FSIA Takings Exception 1957 
 
exhaustion of local remedies, but then proceeded to endorse ex-
haustion as a discretionary rule.106 This Part demonstrates that 
the discretionary rule is, in fact, inconsistent with congressional 
intent. The expropriation exception and related federal law on in-
ternational takings implicitly repudiate comity (as defined below) 
in expropriation cases. It follows that the exhaustion of local rem-
edies, as a gesture of comity to a foreign state, violates the spirit 
of these statutes. 
A. Exhaustion as a Gesture of Comity 
In order to prove that discretionary exhaustion is inappropri-
ate, we must first establish that exhaustion of local remedies, as 
applied in US courts, is rooted in comity. The principle of comity 
is not so much a well-defined legal doctrine as it is a friendly and 
deferential judicial posture toward the interests of another sover-
eign. The Supreme Court refers to it as the “spirit of cooperation 
in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases 
touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states.”107 
This spirit of cooperation has been cited as the basis for re-
quiring parties to exhaust remedies in various contexts. Federal 
courts have, for example, required plaintiffs to exhaust remedies 
in tribal courts when the facts giving rise to the dispute occurred 
on reservation lands. The Supreme Court has stated that, as a 
rule, “considerations of comity direct that tribal remedies be ex-
hausted before the question is addressed by the District Court. 
Promotion of tribal self-government and self-determination re-
quire[ ] that the Tribal Court have the first opportunity to evaluate 
the factual and legal bases for the challenge to its jurisdiction.”108 
A similar exhaustion rule has been extended to states in ha-
beas corpus cases and it is also grounded in comity. The Supreme 
Court, in Darr v Burford,109 noted that when the relevant federal 
habeas statute110 gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear state 
prisoners’ habeas petitions challenging the constitutionality of 
their detention, it “created an area of potential conflict between 
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state and federal courts.”111 This led to a prudential exhaustion 
requirement that was later codified in 28 USC § 2254.112 The 
Court in Darr described the rationale for the exhaustion rule: 
[I]t would be unseemly in our dual system of government for 
a federal district court to upset a state court conviction with-
out an opportunity [for] the state courts to correct a constitu-
tional violation. . . . Solution was found in the doctrine of 
comity between courts, a doctrine which teaches that one 
court should defer action on causes properly within its juris-
diction until the courts of another sovereignty with concur-
rent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had 
an opportunity to pass upon the matter.113 
What is important, for our purposes, is that the rationale for 
this exhaustion requirement is not to promote judicial efficiency, 
ease congestion, or advance any other consideration that exclu-
sively benefits the federal courts. Rather it is a special regard for 
the sovereign interests of another government—comity, in a 
word. This suggests that the exhaustion of local remedies is de-
signed to prevent conflict between sovereigns. 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has not explicitly re-
quired exhaustion of local remedies in foreign countries.114 The 
Ninth Circuit, in Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC,115 however, offered a par-
ticularly clear explanation of the exhaustion rule in the context of 
foreign relations law. The court’s explanation confirms that comity 
is the central reason for the requirement. The court concluded 
that “invoking exhaustion out of respect for another sovereign, as 
we do in the case of tribal courts, resonates most forcefully in the 
international context.”116 It reasoned that “if exhaustion is consid-
ered essential to the smooth operation of international tribunals 
whose jurisdiction is established only through explicit consent 
from other sovereigns, then it is all the more significant in the 
absence of such explicit consent to jurisdiction.”117 So, as in the 
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habeas corpus and tribal court contexts, the exhaustion of local 
remedies in a foreign country is clearly a doctrine of comity. 
B. Comity and the Intent of the Expropriation Exception 
If the exhaustion of local remedies rule is a gesture of comity 
and Congress intended to withhold comity in takings cases, then 
the Ninth Circuit’s discretionary exhaustion requirement is inap-
propriate. There is some indication that Congress intended for the 
courts to withhold comity when a foreign sovereign expropriates 
property in violation of international law. 
One indication is the mere fact that an expropriation excep-
tion to sovereign immunity exists at all. The expropriation excep-
tion is an anomaly within the general scheme of the FSIA. The 
FSIA, as noted earlier, was designed to codify the restrictive the-
ory of sovereign immunity, under which a government’s public 
acts are immune from suit while its commercial acts are not.118 
And most of the FSIA exceptions are consistent with this theory. 
The commercial activity exception is the most obvious example, 
since it abrogates sovereign immunity when “the action is based 
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state.”119 Other exceptions likewise involve nonpublic for-
eign state activity or property within the United States.120 Expro-
priations within a sovereign’s own territory are, by contrast, quin-
tessential public acts normally immune from suit under the 
restrictive theory.121 
The expropriation exception is also an anomaly among the 
sovereign immunity laws of foreign countries and international 
law. According to the Fourth Restatement, “[n]o provision compa-
rable to § 1605(a)(3) has yet been adopted in the domestic immun-
ity statutes of other countries.”122 Furthermore, no “international 
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instrument provide[s] for removal of immunity for alleged viola-
tions of international law or jus cogens.”123 
The point here is that because the expropriation exception is 
so unusual—not inspired by any existing doctrine and not con-
sistent with the restrictive theory—it is a meaningful and delib-
erate legislative intervention in the ordinary operation of sover-
eign immunity doctrine. And since considerations of comity are 
the driving force behind sovereign immunity,124 the expropriation 
exception is, by extension, a deliberate intervention in the ordi-
nary operation of comity. By singling out international takings as 
the only clearly public acts not entitled to immunity, Congress 
tacitly rejected the application of comity when international tak-
ings are alleged. 
The second major indication that comity is disfavored in the 
context of expropriations is the federal legislation passed in the 
wake of Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino.125 In Sabbatino, 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued an order reducing the 
quota for sugar imported from Cuba. The government of Cuba re-
taliated by expropriating the property of certain American-owned 
companies, including sugar owned by Compania Azucarera 
Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (“CAV”), a Cuban company princi-
pally owned by US citizens.126 CAV had contracted to sell that 
sugar to the defendant, an American commodities broker, before 
it was expropriated.127 The defendant ultimately contracted again 
to purchase the sugar, this time from the Cuban government. But 
after receiving the shipment, it paid CAV instead of the Cuban 
government.128 Cuba brought suit in the Southern District of New 
York to recover its payment.129 
The primary question on appeal to the Supreme Court was 
whether the “act of state” doctrine precluded the defendant from 
challenging the validity of the expropriation.130 The act of state 
doctrine, according to the Court, stands for the following principle: 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence 
of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country 
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will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of an-
other done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by 
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open 
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.131 
In other words, when the challenged act is an exercise of the 
foreign state’s sovereign authority, that fact alone is a complete 
defense against liability. This principle, like exhaustion and sov-
ereign immunity, was grounded in “the highest considerations of 
international comity and expediency.”132 Indeed, the Court in-
sisted that subjecting acts of state to the judgment of domestic 
courts “would very certainly imperil the amicable relations be-
tween governments and vex the peace of nations.”133 The Court 
thus concluded that the act of state doctrine applied and barred 
any challenge to Cuba’s expropriation of the sugar.134 In fact, the 
Court was so wary of judicial interference in foreign relations that 
it stated it would apply the act of state doctrine even if the State 
Department criticized the expropriation.135 The Court feared that 
any judicial endorsement of such criticism would offend the for-
eign state.136 
Aghast at the Court’s decision to excuse violations of interna-
tional law—by a communist country no less—Congress enacted 
22 USC § 2370(e)(2), commonly known as the Second Hick-
enlooper Amendment.137 It states that “no court in the United 
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doc-
trine to make a determination on the merits” when rights in prop-
erty are asserted based upon a taking by that state “in violation 
of the principles of international law.”138 This language was spe-
cifically designed to overturn the result in Sabbatino.139 The 
courts have since interpreted the amendment quite narrowly—
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limiting it, for instance, only to cases in which the property is lo-
cated in the United States at the time of the litigation.140 None-
theless, it is an obvious and deliberate legislative intervention in 
the ordinary operation of the act of state doctrine—a comity-
based affirmative defense. The amendment strongly suggests 
that the courts should withhold the benefits of comity when for-
eign governments unlawfully expropriate property within their 
own territory. 
The argument here, to be sure, is not that the FSIA or the 
Second Hickenlooper Amendment explicitly prohibit the applica-
tion of the exhaustion rule on a discretionary basis. The argument 
is, rather, that both statutes evince an intention to subject foreign 
countries to the jurisdiction of US courts when they expropriate 
property. The default rule in such expropriation cases would be 
to dismiss the claim for reasons of comity. These statutes were a 
deliberate legislative intervention to prevent that outcome. To 
import a jurisdiction-stripping principle of comity like the ex-
haustion of local remedies would subvert the intent of Congress. 
And such subversion is especially inappropriate in the area of for-
eign affairs, as it is traditionally considered the exclusive prov-
ince of the political branches.141 
C. Discretionary Exhaustion Without Comity 
The Ninth Circuit frames comity as just one among an indef-
inite list of equitable considerations that could guide the court’s 
discretion in an exhaustion inquiry.142 So perhaps the discretion-
ary exhaustion rule could be salvaged by simply excluding comity 
from consideration. The problem is, however, that the principle of 
comity is undoubtedly at the core of the exhaustion rule, as has 
been demonstrated. There is no history of requiring the exhaus-
tion of local remedies except as an effort to avoid conflict and re-
spect the sovereignty of a foreign power. 
A discretionary exhaustion rule without the consideration of 
comity or sovereignty is, in any case, so similar to forum non con-
veniens that it would be duplicative and unnecessary. Consider 
the Ninth Circuit’s remaining prudential factors after comity is ex-
cluded: “The existence or lack of a significant United States 
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‘nexus,’” “the nature of the allegations and the gravity of the po-
tential violations of international law,” and “whether the allega-
tions implicate matters of ‘universal concern’ for which a state has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims without regard to territoriality 
or the nationality of the parties.”143 The absence of a significant 
US nexus bears on the ease and convenience of litigating the mat-
ter in a US court. The absence of serious international law viola-
tions or “matters of universal concern” bears on the public inter-
est in adjudicating the dispute in the United States. These factors 
of private convenience and public interest could be integrated into 
any forum non conveniens analysis.144 
IV.  NO EXHAUSTION 
It follows that courts should not require plaintiffs to exhaust 
local remedies before filing suit under the FSIA expropriation ex-
ception. This conclusion is in partial agreement with the position of 
the DC Circuit. But that court’s suggestion that the FSIA conclu-
sively preempts exhaustion goes too far. This Part demonstrates 
that the DC Circuit’s view is mistaken as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. The FSIA does not divest courts of the power to 
mandate that plaintiffs exhaust local remedies. 
Recall that the DC Circuit in Philipp I concluded that be-
cause the FSIA was enacted as a comprehensive statement of the 
rules governing sovereign immunity, it foreclosed any extratex-
tual restrictions on jurisdiction.145 The defendant, Germany, had 
argued that the statute did not preclude the exhaustion require-
ment because it is a nonjurisdictional doctrine of the federal com-
mon law.146 But the court dismissed this contention on two 
grounds. The first was that, elsewhere in the statute, the terrorism 
exception explicitly requires that foreign state defendants be 
given an opportunity to arbitrate disputes. The inclusion of such 
a courtesy in that provision led the court to presume that the 
omission of exhaustion in the expropriation exception was inten-
tional.147 The second was that § 1606 of the FSIA “permits only 
defenses, such as forum non conveniens, that are equally 
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available to private individuals. Obviously a private individual 
cannot invoke a sovereign’s right to resolve disputes against it.”148 
The first argument is flawed because the terrorism exception 
was enacted as an amendment to the FSIA in 1996, twenty years 
after the expropriation exception (and the rest of the statute) was 
drafted.149 The unstated premise of the court’s argument is that 
Congress contemplated (and hence tacitly rejected) the possibility 
of allowing foreign states to resolve FSIA disputes themselves. 
But the only evidence of such contemplation comes from a Con-
gress that neither drafted nor enacted the expropriation excep-
tion. The error here is an anachronistic inference of intent. We 
cannot infer anything about what an earlier Congress intended, 
considered, or tacitly rejected from what a later Congress enacted 
because the legislators are not the same. The arbitration require-
ment in the terrorism exception thus tells us very little about 
whether Congress intended to withhold the exhaustion require-
ment in cases falling under the expropriation exception. 
The second argument, meanwhile, has no basis in the legis-
lative history or the plain text of § 1606. That provision states 
that the foreign state “shall be liable in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances.”150 This is a statement confirming that when jurisdiction 
is available under the statute, foreign states will not receive a 
special dispensation from liability.151 The provision does not sug-
gest that the state enjoys only those procedural defenses available 
to private individuals. Indeed, § 1606 itself and a portion of the 
Report of the House of Representatives explaining § 1606 make 
clear that foreign states are still immune from punitive damages 
(even though private defendants are not immune).152 So that pro-
vision does not require the kind of equality between foreign states 
and individuals suggested by the DC Circuit. This means that 
Germany’s original argument stands unrebutted. Even though 
the FSIA comprehensively addresses sovereign immunity, nonju-
risdictional doctrines of federal common law, like exhaustion, are 
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still applicable. The only question is under what circumstances it 
would be appropriate for the court to require exhaustion. And 
here, the court should consider deferring to the executive branch. 
V.  RETURNING TO A SYSTEM OF DEFERENCE 
This Part proposes that courts should require exhaustion 
when the president expressly requests it. The foregoing argu-
ments have shown that the authority for an exhaustion rule could 
not rest solely on the dictates of international law and would not 
be appropriate as an exercise of judicial discretion. However, such 
a rule could be justified with the permission of the executive as 
part of the administration of her foreign relations policy. 
A. Deference on the Basis of Executive Foreign Affairs Powers 
Deference to the president on the question of exhaustion is 
appropriate because courts have recognized a special need for the 
nation to “speak with one voice” in foreign affairs.153 And that 
voice is usually the president’s. Perhaps the strongest statement 
of this principle comes from United States v Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp.154 There, Congress had passed a law empowering the 
president to prohibit the sale of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay if 
he thought it would lead to a cessation of hostilities between the 
two countries. In 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did pre-
cisely that, and the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was in-
dicted for conspiring to sell arms to Bolivia.155 Curtiss-Wright al-
leged that the law was an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power.156 But the Court ultimately concluded that the 
power to restrict the sale of arms to foreign belligerents was in-
herent in national sovereignty and need not come from any spe-
cific constitutional grant.157 It concluded, further, that the presi-
dent may exercise such inherent powers in the field of “external 
affairs” because “[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in 
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign na-
tions.”158 The Court noted that the president “has the better op-
portunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign 
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countries. . . . He has his confidential sources of information.”159 
He is more capable of acting with “caution and secrecy,” which are 
necessary for the success of diplomatic negotiations.160 
To be sure, this strain of executive power maximalism in for-
eign affairs has been roundly criticized by commentators for sev-
eral decades.161 And the Supreme Court has repudiated the dictum 
from Curtiss-Wright that the president is the nation’s “sole organ” 
in international affairs—at least insofar as it implies that the 
president has an “unbounded power” over the nation’s foreign pol-
icy.162 However, the broader principle that the nation should 
“speak with one voice” in foreign affairs and that the president is 
uniquely suited to provide that voice is still valid.163 The Supreme 
Court continues to acknowledge that “[t]he President does have a 
unique role in communicating with foreign governments,” and 
that “only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all 
times” necessary in diplomacy.164 
There is no reason why these functional considerations would 
not apply if the president were to recommend the application of 
the exhaustion of local remedies rule in a given case. The exhaus-
tion rule, like other doctrines of comity within the foreign rela-
tions common law, is designed to prevent the courts from aggra-
vating the relationship between the United States and other 
nations.165 But the president and the State Department are prob-
ably in the best position to know when a lawsuit might jeopardize 
the country’s foreign relations or interfere with the administra-
tion’s foreign policy objectives. 
Furthermore, the courts can require plaintiffs to utilize the 
judicial system of a foreign government only if that government 
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has been recognized by the United States.166 The Supreme Court 
held in Zivotofsky v Kerry167 that the president holds the exclusive 
power of recognition—which includes the power to determine 
when the United States will regard a foreign government as hav-
ing sovereign authority over a territory.168 This power was implied 
from the fact that the president alone has the constitutional au-
thority to negotiate treaties, receive ambassadors, and dispatch 
diplomatic agents—actions which effect recognition under interna-
tional law.169 The Court channeled some of the maximalist rhetoric 
from Curtiss-Wright, affirming the president’s unique role in rec-
ognizing foreign sovereigns and conducting American diplomacy: 
Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must speak with 
one voice. That voice must be the President’s. . . . [O]nly the 
Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times. And 
with unity comes the ability to exercise, to a greater degree, 
decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch. The President is ca-
pable, in ways Congress is not, of engaging in the delicate 
and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead to a deci-
sion on recognition.170 
Because the exhaustion requirement, as a privilege of sover-
eignty, depends on the recognition of the sovereign, the president 
should surely have a say in determining when it applies. 
It remains only to determine what the nature and scope of 
the president’s authority should be in such a system. Deference 
in the context of foreign affairs, as one legal scholar notes, “can 
mean a variety of propositions, ranging from the weight given to 
an argument based on its persuasive power, to acceptance of the 
executive branch’s views of international facts, to judicial absten-
tion under the political question doctrine.”171 Deference, here, 
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should mean that where representatives of the executive branch 
explicitly recommend that a court force an FSIA takings plaintiff 
to exhaust local remedies, that recommendation should be a 
strongly persuasive (but ultimately nonbinding) consideration in 
the judge’s decision to impose the requirement.172 Since the basis 
for the deference is to ensure consistency with US foreign policy, 
the executive would also have to determine that applying the ex-
haustion rule would advance the national interest or foreign pol-
icy objectives of the United States. This would require a detailed 
description of the factual circumstances warranting an applica-
tion of the exhaustion rule, including the foreign policy interest 
at stake and the effect of the litigation on the nation’s relationship 
with the defendant state. A scholarly brief merely interpreting 
the FSIA and opining on the intent of the statute would not be 
entitled to deference, as statutory interpretation is well within 
the core competency of the courts. 
This would be similar to the kind of deference the courts have 
accorded the executive branch in other contexts. For example, 
during the Cold War, the Justice and State Departments deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis whether unrecognized govern-
ments had standing to sue in the United States, and courts gen-
erally deferred to their recommendations.173 Additionally, 
although the Second Hickenlooper Amendment generally prohib-
its application of the act of state doctrine in cases of unlawful ex-
propriation, it contains an exception for presidential authoriza-
tion. It states that the courts may apply the act of state doctrine 
if “the President determines that application of the act of state 
doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy 
interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is 
filed on his behalf in that case with the court.”174 
Courts have also recognized a so-called “Bernstein exception” 
to the act of state doctrine that similarly promotes a case-by-case 
deference to the executive. Some courts, following this exception, 
will refrain from applying the act of state doctrine if the State De-
partment submits a letter stating that judicial review of an act of 
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state would not damage the nation’s foreign relations.175 The earli-
est instance of this kind of deference comes from the eponymous 
Bernstein v N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij.176 The plaintiff in that case, a Jewish business 
owner, alleged that Nazi officials forced him to transfer his shares 
in the business to a third party. That party, in turn, transferred 
the shares to the defendant. The court had ruled, in an earlier 
attempt by the plaintiff to obtain relief, that “[it] would not pass 
upon charges of wrongful conduct by officials of a foreign state.”177 
And so the plaintiff eventually obtained a letter from the acting 
legal adviser of the State Department which declared that “[t]he 
policy of the Executive . . . is to relieve American courts from any 
restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the 
validity of the acts of Nazi officials.”178 The Second Circuit de-
ferred to this statement of executive policy: “In view of this super-
vening expression of Executive Policy, we amend our mandate in 
this case by striking out all restraints based on the inability of the 
court to pass on acts of officials in Germany during the period in 
question.”179 The Supreme Court has never formally endorsed this 
exception, and some justices have cast doubt on its validity,180 but 
other justices have expressed their approval in principle.181 
Certainly, the Bernstein exception is not without contro-
versy, and the concerns it raises could also arise with a deference-
based exhaustion requirement. For example, one commentator 
has noted that the Bernstein exception might force courts to treat 
similarly situated parties unequally, resulting in unpredictable 
and inconsistent case law. It also strips courts, to a modest 
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degree, of their independence and discretion.182 Instead of decid-
ing for themselves whether the act of state doctrine applies, 
courts essentially outsource this judgment to the executive 
branch. This could be perceived as an abdication of the judicial 
responsibility to “say what the law is.”183 
But these effects are not as significant as they appear. As 
then-Justice William Rehnquist noted in First National City 
Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba,184 “[t]he act of state doctrine is 
grounded on judicial concern that application of customary prin-
ciples of law to judge the acts of a foreign sovereign might frus-
trate the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of 
the government.”185 Thus a statement from the Executive Branch 
that the court would not harm the national interest by reviewing 
an act of state would obviate the doctrine.186 The principle under-
lying this conclusion comes from the “classical common-law 
maxim that ‘the reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also 
ceases.’”187 In other words, a central purpose of the very doctrine 
at issue is to avoid interference with the foreign policy of the po-
litical branches—precisely the opposite of asserting independent 
judicial authority. So the concern for judicial independence seems 
misplaced. Moreover, if the act of state doctrine is applied in a 
highly variable manner, this is just a necessary consequence of 
ensuring that the doctrine is applied only where the circum-
stances are such that it would serve its purpose. Exhaustion of 
local remedies, a cognate doctrine of comity serving a similar 
function, may be justified on similar grounds. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has signaled that deference to 
the executive branch might be appropriate when it intervenes on 
a case-by-case basis to express an opinion on whether the court 
should exercise jurisdiction under the FSIA. In Republic of Aus-
tria v Altmann,188 the US government submitted an amicus brief 
recommending that courts should not apply the FSIA to expropri-
ations and other conduct by foreign states that occurred before 
the statute was enacted. The Court ultimately rejected this rec-
ommendation, noting that it “concerns interpretation of the 
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FSIA’s reach—a pure question of statutory construction well 
within the province of the Judiciary.”189 However, it went on to 
note that “should the State Department choose to express its opin-
ion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular 
petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion 
might well be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of 
the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.”190 The 
Court added that it “express[es] no opinion on the question 
whether such deference should be granted in cases covered by the 
FSIA.”191 While not a definitive endorsement of deference, this 
suggests that, in the Court’s view, deference on a case-by-case ba-
sis could be justified and is not obviously prohibited by the FSIA. 
In sum, courts should be willing to defer to the president’s 
recommendation of the exhaustion rule on a case-by-case basis. 
First, such deference is appropriate, as a practical matter, be-
cause the president is best positioned to know when the immedi-
ate exercise of jurisdiction will vex the comity of nations. Second, 
only the president has the power to recognize a foreign govern-
ment as sovereign, and such recognition is a necessary condition 
for such courtesies as the exhaustion of local remedies. Third, 
courts have, in the past, deferred to the executive’s judgment on 
similar questions involving foreign relations. And finally, this po-
sition is consonant with the dictum in Altmann that deference to 
the executive “might well” be appropriate in some matters involv-
ing international relations. 
B. Exhaustion Without Congressional Authorization 
Implementing this deference framework may raise thorny 
separation of powers concerns. Nothing within the language of 
the FSIA expropriation exception explicitly authorizes or prohib-
its the president from recommending the exhaustion requirement 
in a given case. But such a recommendation would be, no doubt, 
in tension with the central object of the provision—subjecting for-
eign states to the jurisdiction of US courts when they expropriate 
property. Thus, if the president recommends that a court dismiss 
an FSIA suit or stay proceedings on the ground that the plaintiff 
has not exhausted local remedies, this could potentially place the 
executive at variance with Congress. 
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The seminal case for reviewing executive action under such 
circumstances is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer.192 The 
case was precipitated by a labor dispute in the steel industry; 
the union representing steel workers threatened a strike in or-
der to secure favorable terms on their collective bargaining 
agreement. President Harry S. Truman, fearing that a disrup-
tion in the supply of steel would threaten national security, or-
dered the secretary of commerce to seize control of the steel 
mills. The steel companies subsequently filed suit seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief.193 Justice Hugo Black, writing for 
the majority, ultimately concluded that no statute or provision 
of the Constitution authorized the seizure.194 
But the case’s most enduring legacy is Justice Robert Jack-
son’s concurrence, in which he laid out a three-part schema for 
reviewing the constitutionality of presidential acts. First, where 
Congress authorizes presidential action, presidential power is at 
its maximum and the action is presumed valid.195 Second, where 
Congress has neither granted nor denied the authority to act, the 
president must rely on his own independent authority.196 The va-
lidity of the act becomes a fact-sensitive inquiry that varies from 
case to case depending on “the imperatives of events and contem-
porary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”197 
Finally, where the president acts contrary to a congressional di-
rective, the act is valid only if the president’s power is exclusive 
and the congressional directive is unconstitutional.198 The Court 
formally endorsed this framework in Dames & Moore v Regan,199 
but with the qualification that the analysis is best applied as a 
continuum (rather than a set of discrete categories) ranging from 
express congressional approval to express disapproval.200 
A critic of the proposal advanced in this Comment could ar-
gue that the president does not have the authority to request ex-
haustion under this Youngstown framework. Such a critic would 
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point out that although the FSIA neither explicitly authorizes nor 
prohibits the president from determining when exhaustion ap-
plies, Congress’s intent to convert sovereign immunity into a ju-
dicial determination free of political influence is clear.201 Con-
gress’s hostility to the application of comity in cases of 
international expropriation is also evident.202 For this reason, a 
statement from the executive determining that the plaintiff 
should exhaust local remedies would likely fall somewhere be-
tween Youngstown category two (congressional silence) and cate-
gory three (congressional prohibition). This means that the pres-
ident would have to rely on his independent authority under 
Article II of the Constitution. And, of course, no provision of Arti-
cle II empowers the president to dictate when a doctrine of federal 
common law, like exhaustion, must be applied.203 
But this critique misconceives the proposal advanced in this 
Comment. The proposal only permits the president to make a rec-
ommendation—not a binding determination—that exhaustion 
applies. It is the court that ultimately imposes (or declines to im-
pose) the exhaustion requirement. Because the president’s recom-
mendation is purely precatory, the Youngstown analysis does not 
apply. The president’s recommendation does not conflict with 
Congress in a way that falls outside his constitutional power. 
C. Additional Considerations 
The drafters of the FSIA aimed to free the determination of 
sovereign immunity from the caprice of executive policy—replac-
ing a variable and ad hoc application of the doctrine with a pre-
dictable statutory scheme.204 And so a practice of deferring to the 
executive branch seems regressive and undesirable. But that con-
cern overstates the problem. The imposition of an exhaustion re-
quirement, under this proposal, is not left to the president’s 
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unfettered discretion. Plaintiffs can avoid the exhaustion require-
ment “by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unob-
tainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.”205 
This could even include when the plaintiff’s claims are barred by 
the statute of limitations in the foreign state.206 These internal 
limitations on the exhaustion rule ensure that plaintiffs, in some 
cases, will have access to US courts notwithstanding the execu-
tive’s recommendation. 
Furthermore, this proposal grants the executive a substan-
tially more limited role in the jurisdictional inquiry than it had 
under the pre-FSIA regime. First, it applies only to the expropri-
ation exception and not the other jurisdiction-granting provisions 
of the statute. Second, it applies only to the application of the ex-
haustion rule and not the entire determination of sovereign im-
munity. The president is not able to make a deference-worthy rec-
ommendation as to which countries are immune from suit and 
which are not (like in the past). The courts decide that question. 
The president can only make a recommendation regarding 
whether to force a plaintiff to exhaust local remedies. Third, the 
executive must still determine that the exhaustion rule would ad-
vance the national interest or foreign policy objectives of the 
United States in a particular case. And so the recommendation 
could not be based on caprice, pretext, or legal opinions having 
little to do with foreign policy or any other compelling national 
interest. A court that is not persuaded that the president’s re-
quest rests on a legitimate policy concern would be free to deny 
that request and hear the case without requiring the plaintiff to 
exhaust local remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, the authority to mandate that an FSIA takings plaintiff 
exhaust local remedies cannot come from customary interna-
tional law. Indeed, the exhaustion rule, as stated in international 
law, does not apply in the domestic context, it might not be oper-
able in US courts without statutory authorization, and it could 
generate a preclusion trap. Nor should it be applied as a matter 
of judicial discretion, as this would conflict with congressional 
 
 205 Cassirer II, 580 F3d at 1063 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Sarei, 550 F3d at 832. 
 206 See, for example, Chang v Baxter Healthcare Corp, 599 F3d 728, 736 (7th Cir 2010) 
(“[T]he cases suggest that if the plaintiff’s suit would be time-barred in the alternative 
forum, his remedy there is inadequate—is no remedy at all, in a practical sense.”). 
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intent in the area of foreign policy. Instead, the sole basis for ever 
requiring exhaustion to sue under the expropriation exception 
should be the recommendation of the executive. This position, it 
is important to note, is not premised on an inflexible separation-
of-powers formalism. It does not imply that any judicial interfer-
ence with the foreign policy of the political branches is impermis-
sible. Nor does it imply that the authority of the executive recom-
mendation is binding. The position implies only that in this 
narrow circumstance, where the FSIA neither authorizes nor ex-
plicitly prohibits an exhaustion requirement, the decision to ap-
ply it should rest on the approval of a political branch. That ap-
proval does not come from Congress, given the general intent of 
the expropriation exception. But it may come, independently, 
from the executive. And such deference to the executive would be 
constitutionally appropriate and advantageous because of the 
president’s unique authority in the realm of foreign affairs. 
